Ojukwu and Nigerian federalism (3)

By Opeyemi Agbaje

 

With failure of the majors’ coup, and Major-General Ironsi prevailing, Nigeria entered military rule with Ironsi as Head of State. Nzeogwu expressed regrets that tribal considerations subverted the coup which in his words “failed because of incompetence and misguided considerations” of the Southern contingent. Ironsi was ill-prepared and ill-suited intellectually and administratively for national leadership, displaying serial mis-judgments culminating in the counter-coup which terminated his regime and life in July 1966. The final spark was the unification decree – Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No 34 of 1966 – which sought to abolish the four regions, convert them into “groups of provinces” and unify public services under a single Public Service Commission.

The decree engendered strong objection from the North – Northern civil servants staged public demonstrations and Northern Emirs reportedly sent Ironsi a secret memorandum demanding abrogation of the contentious decree or secession. In May 1966, riots and a bloodbath erupted in the North with at least 3,000 Easterners killed, and others fleeing South. How did Ojukwu, who had become Governor of the Eastern Region since January 1966, react? He pleaded with Igbos to return up North and in June 1966, barely a month after the massacre, he appointed his old friend, Emir of Kano, Chancellor of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. These couldn’t be sensibly described as reactions of someone nursing secessionist ambitions.

On July 29, 1966, the much-awaited (multiple sources, including General Madiebo, later Biafran Army Chief, had warned Ironsi) revenge-coup took place. The initial objective of the Northern officers who led the coup (Murtala Muhammed, Yakubu Gowon, Theophilus Danjuma, et al) appeared clearly to be secession (“araba” – separation in Hausa) from Nigeria until they were reportedly persuaded by the British High Commissioner that “you’ve got it all now; why settle for half” and Gowon became Head of State, leading to Ojukwu’s first disagreement with the Northern military establishment. Consistent with his (naïve) nationalism and pro-establishment inclinations, as well as his desire to maintain the integrity of the last remaining national organisation – the army – Ojukwu insisted on following military hierarchy which required Brigadier Ogundipe, Ironsi’s No. 2 as Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters and Western officer to take over as Head of State. Unfortunately, Ogundipe had been successfully intimidated from staking a claim to the office, and accepted posting as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom.

Many Eastern/Igbo officers had been killed during the July counter-coup, evidently as collateral revenge for the earlier deaths in January. In September 1966, a second pogrom commenced with large scale killings everywhere across Northern Nigeria. After Gowon’s broadcast on September 29, rather than abate, the killings intensified. Pain, anger and rage were felt across the East, especially by Ojukwu who, to his eternal regret, had urged those who fled in May to return, many to their brutal end. I find it hard to fault Ojukwu’s subsequent resolve to insist on securing security and protection for the Igbos. There was a manifest need for Nigeria, if it wanted Igbos in the country, to offer regrets, firm assurances and restitution, but none was forthcoming. Even if some military officers of Igbo origin were guilty of killing Northern military and political figures, that could not excuse genocide directed against thousands of civilians, especially after revenge had already been vented against Ironsi and several Igbo officers. The first threat of force was issued by Gowon on 30/11/66 and the first shells were fired on 6/7/67 by the “federal” side.

The Aburi agreement, meant to resolve the crisis, freely signed by all parties under Ghanaian leader, General Ankrah’s auspices, was unilaterally rejected by Gowon upon his return to Lagos on 26/1/67. The accord established equal, federal control over the armed forces through the Supreme Military Council (SMC); a military HQ with equal regional representation; regional military area commands; major national appointments – diplomatic, senior armed forces and police, and “super-scale” federal civil service and corporations – would be made by the SMC. In effect, Ojukwu’s quest was equality of federating regions and rejection of hegemony. Unceasing calls for “true federalism”, “zoning”, “rotation”, “federal character”, “non-marginalisation”, etc., show that Ojukwu’s position was prescient. He had his faults – questions about military strategy and governance in Biafra; neglecting fears of non-Igbo minorities; naively joining the NPN upon his return from exile; an anti-June 12 (and pro-Abacha) posture during the Abiola and Ken Saro-Wiwa matters, etc – but his place in Nigerian history (and Igbo folklore) is assured.

In 2012, forty-six years after 1966, we still talk about politically-inspired violence, such as last year’s post-election killings. The report of the Justice Onyiuke Tribunal in 1966 suggests that 45,397 were killed and over 1.6million fled East. Was Ojukwu expected to acquiesce in this? Was “Biafra” not entitled to legitimate self-defence in these circumstances? It is time the truth about 1966 is established. The underlying issue in the events of 1966/1967-1970 was the nature of our federalism and the need for equity and equality amongst Nigeria’s federating units. That issue would not go away. As Attahiru Jega wrote in Foundations of Nigerian Federalism: 1960-1995 edited by Elaigwu and Akindele, “In a pluralistic society such as Nigeria, with a federal set-up in which dominant nationalities are regionally located, with skewed access to power and societal resources, where national resources are concentrated at the centre and the military have dominated politics, centrifugal forces would, invariably, tend to predominate.”

When federalism was accepted by Nigeria’s leaders at the Constitutional Conference in 1953, it was recognised as “the only feasible answer to the problems of national integration”.